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INTRODUCTION
A window and a lawnmower have one thing in common—you can
buy both of them at Home Depot.  Each is a product that is widely1
available in the market. Yet, if a defect in either product damages
another piece of your property, you will likely have very different
options for recovery. Under the economic loss rule (ELR), a
defendant window manufacturer, unlike the lawnmower manufac-
turer, may ask the court to find a contractual relationship linking
the defective window with your damaged property to preclude your
tort cause of action.2
Traditional concepts of products liability suggest that if the lawn-
mower blade flew off and broke your window, then you may sue the
lawnmower manufacturer for this damage to your property.  The3
law will recognize a clear distinction between the lawnmower and
your house as separate pieces of property.  The damage that the4
lawnmower caused to your house will likely support a tort cause of
action against the lawnmower manufacturer.5
This analysis changes if your house were to be damaged by the
window itself. Perhaps the seals within the window were defective,
allowing water to penetrate into the wall cavity and ultimately
causing your exterior wall to rot from within. In this situation, a
court will likely consider whether there was any contract linking
the window purchase and installation with the overall construction
of the surrounding wall before evaluating the merits of your tort
claim against the window manufacturer.6
For example, you might have spent the summer converting your
garage into a new home office. You began by replacing your double-
hung windows with some modern casement windows. After week-
1. THE HOME DEPOT, http://www.homedepot.com (last visited Sept. 20, 2011)
(advertising windows and lawnmowers).
2. See infra Part III.
3. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, at 694-
96 (5th ed. 1984).
4. Id. § 99, at 695 (“[T]he product must be defective in the kind of way that subjects
persons or tangible property to an unreasonable risk of harm.”).
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. See infra Part III.
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ends of hanging drywall, leveling floors, and mitering trim, the
room finally smells like fresh paint and is filled with new furniture. 
Your neighbor was so impressed with your work that he hired a
contractor to give his garage the same transformation. Amazingly,
his renovation meticulously copied each of your construction details,
even the make and model of your windows. Unfortunately, that
window model was defective; the seals were not designed properly.
After a few hard rains you both noticed water stains on your walls
and carpet. The defective windows have thus ruined both renova-
tions.
Fortunately for you, each of your construction materials was pur-
chased separately as needed. Because no single contract governed
your entire renovation or your expectations of the project, the law
will likely recognize the damage caused to your walls by the leaking
windows as property damage.  Because the windows damaged your7
other property, which is distinguishable from the windows, you will
be permitted to bring a tort action against the window manufac-
turer.8
Your neighbor, on the other hand, having contracted for the
entire renovation, will not be so lucky. Under the ELR, the law will
look to this contract and interpret the completed renovation as a
single product because the construction contract should have
protected his expectations in the project.  The water damage to his9
walls will likely be categorized as disappointed expectations in the
renovation rather than as damage to a separate, distinguishable
piece of property. The ELR, then, will likely preclude your neighbor
from suing the window manufacturer in tort for this economic loss.10
If a warranty from the manufacturer does not cover the damage,
then your neighbor’s recovery will be limited to claims arising under
his contract with the builder. The ELR will therefore force your
neighbor to initiate a series of liability and indemnity actions,
which will drag the contractor, subcontractor, and all other related
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part III.A.
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parties into litigation before the claim eventually, if ever, reaches
the negligent manufacturer.11
This Note will make two primary arguments. The first is that the
mere presence of a construction contract should not preclude tort
recovery against a remote manufacturer. For practical reasons
beyond products liability law, construction projects require a com-
plex series of interrelated contracts.  This arrangement prevents12
building owners from negotiating sales contracts directly with
construction material manufacturers or suppliers.  Although war-13
ranty law might effectively shift the cost of damages caused by
defective construction materials away from the building owner,14
the net effect of the ensuing litigation tends to shield negligent
manufacturers and suppliers from liability.  15
The second argument is that, rather than stretching the product-
component analysis discussed in East River Steamship Corp. v.
Transamerica Delaval Inc.,  the courts should look to Saratoga16
Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co.  for guidance in construction17
material defect cases.  By characterizing the purchase of a product18
from the marketplace as a transition from manufacturing to the use
of a product, Saratoga provides a framework that can appropriately
distinguish between the sales contracts and the service contracts of
a construction project.  This distinction will permit a building19
owner to pursue a tort claim directly against a construction mate-
rial manufacturer or supplier without unnecessarily entangling the
remaining project team in litigation. This approach focuses on the
substance of construction contracts and the service that contractors
provide rather than a common, but misguided, notion that contrac-
tors sell a discrete product, which they unilaterally created. While
permitting tort claims against construction material manufacturers
11. See infra Part III. Insurance adds an additional layer of complexity and is addressed
briefly in Part IV.C.
12. See Carl J. Circo, Placing the Commercial and Economic Loss Problem in the
Construction Industry Context, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 39, 96-97 (2007).
13. See infra Part III.B.
14. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Part IV.D.
16. 476 U.S. 858 (1986). 
17. 520 U.S. 875 (1997). 
18. See infra Part IV.B.
19. See infra Part IV.B.
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and suppliers, the Saratoga framework preserves the ELR as it
pertains to risks that construction contracts can properly man-
age—such as defective construction or design.20
I. THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT
A brief introduction to construction contracts is necessary to
show why they do not effectively negotiate the risk of product
defects. Building construction often relies on a plethora of interre-
lated contracts, subcontracts, and sub-subcontracts, especially in
the context of commercial construction projects.  Despite this21
multitude of contracts, the building owner (Owner) rarely negoti-
ates directly with more than a few of the numerous parties required
to complete the construction project (Project Team).  22
The Owner typically negotiates and contracts with only two
distinct parties : (1) the architect (Architect),  who is responsible23 24
for designing the project, and (2) the prime contractor (Contractor),
who is responsible for building the proposed design according to the
Architect’s drawings and specifications. Each of these parties
subsequently delegates responsibility for design and construction
20. A recent article argues that the ELR should not protect a negligent subcontractor.
Thomas J. Craven, Comment, The Fourth Circuit Sinks Admiral Dur’s Boat and Virginia’s
Economic Loss Rule Insulates a Negligent Subcontractor from Tort Liability, 16 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 747, 757, 764-65 (2009). This Note does not challenge the application of the ELR to
subcontracted services within the construction industry. It addresses the unique problem of
how the ELR channels defective construction materials claims into contract law, despite the
inadequacy of construction contracts to accommodate this risk.
21. CONSTR. SPECIFICATIONS INST., THE PROJECT RESOURCE MANUAL §§ 3.3.5 to 3.4 (5th
ed. 2005) [hereinafter CSI] (describing various possible project delivery methods and the
contractual structure for each). Consider, for example, the contractual relationships in a
multiple-prime contract, a variation of the common single-prime contract. Id. § 3.3.5.2 fig.3.3-
D; see also id. § 3.3.5.1.
22. Id. §§ 3.3.5 to 3.4.
23. This arrangement is ideal, despite the problem of tracing liability for decisions such
as the selection of construction materials. By contracting directly with the Owner, the
interests of both the Architect and the Contractor are aligned with the Owner’s interests.
Consider the potential for abuse if the Contractor were subcontracted to the Architect—the
Contractor might be encouraged to support all of the Architect’s costly design proposals.
Likewise, if the Architect were subcontracted to the Contractor, the Architect might feel
pressure to maximize the efficiency, rather than the artistic quality, of design.
24. Depending on the type of project, it may be possible for an Owner to contract directly
with an engineer, rather than an Architect. See CSI, supra note 21, § 1.3.
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through a series of subcontracts. It is therefore very unlikely that
the Owner will ever have the opportunity, or knowledge required,
to negotiate the risk of product failure directly with the construc-
tion material manufacturer, supplier, or product representative
(collectively referred to as the “Supply Team”) because these parties
are so far removed from the Owner.  25
A. The Owner-Architect Agreement
The construction process begins when the Owner contracts with
an Architect to design the project.  The Architect may then sub-26
contract with additional consultants such as engineers and interior
designers for their specific expertise.  Collectively, these parties27
will form the design team (A/E),  with the Architect remaining28
directly liable to the Owner for the work of his consultants.  29
The A/E’s ultimate purpose is to prepare the drawings and
specifications to guide the Contractor’s completion of the project.30
It is important to distinguish the A/E’s responsibility to provide
plans and specifications from the Contractor’s responsibility to
direct “means and methods” of the project.  Although the A/E pro-31
vides the cumulative design of the project, means and methods
25. Id. § 1.2.4 (describing the role and responsibilities of the Supply Team). Although an
Owner may use a purchasing contract to purchase goods directly from a manufacturer, this
process will likely be used only for purchasing freestanding pieces of equipment or furniture
because the manufacturer may only participate in construction under a subcontract
agreement with the construction contractor. Id. § 5.15.
26. This Note intentionally omits other steps in the building life cycle, such as project
conception, for the purpose of clarity. See id. §§ 1.5, 2.1. Other project delivery methods exist,
but the design-bid-build method described is most common and most relevant to this Note.
27. Id. §§ 1.2-1.3 & fig.1.2-A. Engineering services are often required for the structural,
electrical, mechanical (primarily heating and cooling), plumbing, and civil engineering design
of the building.
28. A/E is a term commonly used to represent the Architect/Engineer, but it may also be
used to represent the design team generally. Id. §§ 1.2.2, 1.3.
29. E.g., COMMONWEALTH OF VA., DEP’T OF GEN. SERVS., DIV. OF ENG’G & BLDGS., BUREAU
OF CAPITAL OUTLAY MGMT. CONSTRUCTION & PROFESSIONAL SERVICES MANUAL § 313.0
(2004), available at http://www.dgs.virginia.gov/LinkClick.aspx?link=403 (permitting an
Architect to subcontract portions of his work but requiring that the Architect “remain fully
liable and responsible for all Work performed by his consultants ... and shall assure that [his]
Work complies with all requirements of the [Owner-Architect contract]”).
30. CSI, supra note 21, § 5.1.
31. Id. § 7.9.8.
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encompass the Contractor’s process of physically constructing the
building.  There is, in sum, a clear distribution of authority for32
different roles in a construction project.
B. The Owner-Contractor Agreement
The Owner-Contractor agreement governs the construction of
the project.  The Contractor is responsible for a wide variety of33
tasks related to the daily operations of the project. Among these is
a responsibility to purchase the construction materials and to
warrant construction materials against defects.  This guarantee34
is typically limited to one year and may require the Contractor to
correct any defects rather than pay liquidated damages.  Although35
this warranty is valuable to the Owner, especially in light of the
ELR, the Contractor does not have the same capabilities to test for
defects as the individual product manufacturers.  36
Like the Architect, the Contractor requires help from many other
parties as subcontractors.  The Contractor and all of the parties37
with whom he subcontracts are generally referred to as the
“Construction Team.”
C. The Important Role of the Supply Team
The A/E cannot know enough about the seemingly infinite num-
ber of available construction materials to complete the specifica-
tions by itself.  Even if the A/E specifies a common product that it38
32. Id.
33. Id. § 7.2.3.
34. Id. § 7.2 fig.7.2-A. 
35. See David A. Senter, Construction Warranties and Guarantees: A Primer, CONSTR.
L., Winter 2003, at 17 (describing how the form contracts provided by the American Institute
of Architects, the Associated General Contractors of America, and the Construction Owners
Association of America require the Contractor to guarantee the quality of materials, usually
for one year).
36. See Circo, supra note 12, at 98 (“[T]he risk of physical harm created by products ...
is a risk uniquely within the control of manufacturers and one that is beyond any risk
allocation functions that product sales transactions can achieve.”).
37. CSI, supra note 21, § 6.6.
38. The author’s personal experience in architecture has proven that specifying
something as ubiquitous as gypsum wallboard can still require Supply Team assistance to
meet building code requirements, such as fire-rated wall assemblies. See, e.g., NAT’L GYPSUM
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has used in the past, it will still need additional information, such
as product lead times, which can vary from project to project.39
The Supply Team therefore plays a critical role during the design
phase by helping the A/Es select appropriate products, assisting
with the preparation of specifications, and explaining detailed in-
formation about each product.  Supply Team members generally40
act as “technical experts” to help the A/E navigate the sea of avail-
able construction materials.  Because the contract documents do41
not always specify which particular products are to be used, the
Construction Team must also rely on the Supply Team’s expertise
when purchasing construction materials.42
II. THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE
The ELR distinguishes personal injury and property damage,
which are recoverable in tort, from mere economic loss, which is
recoverable only under the terms of a contract.  Therefore, a con-43
tract action, such as breach of warranty, is the only way a building
owner can recover damages that are classified as economic losses.
As a matter of policy, courts generally believe that contract law
risks being subsumed by tort law  and that the ELR provides an44
appropriate demarcation between these competing doctrines.45
The following discussion will trace the evolution of products
liability and the ELR. In addition to providing historical perspec-
CO., NATIONAL GYPSUM CONSTRUCTION GUIDE 84 (12th ed. 2008), available at http://
nationalgypsum.com/resources/gypsum-con-guide.htm (describing and detailing fire-rated
wall assemblies). 
39. CSI, supra note 21, § 4.4.5.
40. Id.
41. Id. § 5.1.
42. Of the four methods of specifying, only propriety specifications “specif[y] actual brand
names, model numbers, and other proprietary information.” Id. § 5.7. Proprietary
specification is not appropriate in many instances, particularly because “the federal
government and other public authorities restrict the use of proprietary ... specifications.” Id.
§ 5.7.5.
43. See, e.g., E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Deleval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 876 (1986).
44. Id. at 866.
45. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 150-52 (Cal. 1965) (providing the majority
argument). But see Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 308-11 (N.J. 1965)
(providing the minority argument for permitting recovery in tort), abrogated by Alloway v.
Gen. Marine Indus., L.P., 695 A.2d 264, 269-72 (N.J. 1997). 
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tive, the discussion will begin to demonstrate why courts adopting
the East River analysis have failed to appreciate the practical
realities of complex contractual agreements in their attempt to
protect the conceptual integrity of contract law.
A. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.
Although the earliest traces of consumer protection date back to
1603,  MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. established basic principles46
of modern products liability.  The plaintiff, MacPherson, was47
ejected from his car after defective wood spokes caused a wheel to
collapse.  MacPherson suffered injuries and sued Buick, the car’s48
manufacturer, for negligence.  Although the wheel had been manu-49
factured by a completely different company, MacPherson argued
that Buick would have discovered the defect if it had adequately
inspected the wheel.  MacPherson lacked any contractual privity50
with Buick because he purchased the car from an intermediate
dealer.  The question, therefore, became whether the defendant car51
manufacturer owed subsequent purchasers of the car any duty that
would support such a tort claim.52
For guidance, the MacPherson court looked back to Thomas v.
Winchester, which linked a remote seller’s negligence to foresee-
ability of harm.  While considering this principle, the court53
distinguished situations in which a buyer was aware of a defect and
46. Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine,
Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1131 & n.72
(1974) [hereinafter Shapo, Theory]; see also Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 135 P. 633, 634-36
(Wash. 1913) (evaluating a claim for lost reputation and lost profits); Hadley v. Baxendale,
(1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch.) 147-48 (using foreseeability to evaluate a claim for lost
profits); Chandelor v. Lopus, (1603) 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (Exch.) 3-4; MARSHALL S. SHAPO,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 19-24 (1993) [hereinafter SHAPO, SEARCH]
(discussing important foundational products liability cases).
47. 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (Cardozo, J.); Shapo, Theory, supra note 46, at 1137
(describing the opinion as “a masterpiece of judicial synthesis”). 
48. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1051.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1051, 1053 (citing Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 407-11 (1852)).
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knowingly accepted the risk of harm  and situations in which the54
manufacturer knew that subsequent purchasers would independ-
ently test the product for defects.  The court held that, because55
many products are dangerous if they are negligently made, a manu-
facturer owes consumers a duty to make his product carefully.56
Privity of contract does not limit this duty; “the source of the
obligation [is] where it ought to be ... in the law.”57
Although the court touched on the relevance of this products
liability principle to property damage,  its holding was limited to58
personal injury.  Nevertheless, Judge Cardozo’s analysis relied on59
two important considerations, both of which establish a theme in
this Note: (1) the duty arose from the foreseeability that product
defects will cause harm;  and (2) the manufacturer released his60
product into the marketplace, where any undisclosed defects were
less likely to be discovered.61
B. Seely v. White Motor Co.
Almost fifty years after MacPherson, the Supreme Court of
California reconciled strict liability in tort for defective products
with the warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) in Seely v. White Motor Co.  Seely also involved the sale of62
an automobile, but it presented a much more complex factual
scenario than MacPherson.
54. Id. at 1051-52 (citing Loop v. Litchfield, 42 N.Y. 351, 360-61 (1870)).
55. Id. at 1052 (citing Losee v. Clute, 51 N.Y. 494, 495-97 (1873)).
56. Id. at 1053; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 96, at 682-83 (discussing the
impact of MacPherson).
57. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053. Judge Cardozo adopted broader criteria for finding
negligence liability in his later opinions, such as Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162
N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928). See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY 126 (expanded ed. 2003). This Note argues that MacPherson struck an appropriate
balance between the foreseeability of harm to a remote purchaser and the catastrophic
consequences of “unlimited [tort] liability to remote persons.” Id. at 125-26.
58. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1052-53 (discussing English law).
59. Id. at 1053. Judge Cardozo later expanded this principle to permit tort recovery for
economic loss in an analogous situation. See Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 275-76 (N.Y.
1922). 
60. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1054-55.
61. Id. at 1055.
62. 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965).
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Seely, a trucker, purchased his truck through an intermediate
dealer.  The sales contract contained an express warranty by the63
manufacturer, White Motor Company (White).  As Seely tried to64
make a turn, the brakes gave out and the truck rolled over.65
Although Seely was not physically injured, the truck suffered
damages and Seely paid to repair it.  After the incident, Seely66
stopped making payments on the truck, and the dealer repossessed
it.  Seely’s business lost profits as a result of the repossession.67 68
On appeal, the court provided the following analysis to distin-
guish the appropriate applications of strict liability and UCC
remedies in the context of products defect claims:
A consumer should not be charged at the will of the manufac-
turer with bearing the risk of physical injury when he buys a
product on the market. He can, however, be fairly charged with
the risk that the product will not match his economic expecta-
tions unless the manufacturer agrees that it will. Even in
actions for negligence, a manufacturer’s liability is limited to
damages for physical injuries and there is no recovery for
economic loss alone.69
Relying on this analysis, and recognizing that White’s express
warranty to Seely encompassed these commercial losses,  the court70
affirmed the award of damages for lost profits and Seely’s payments
on the purchase price.  71
The Seely court also extended the scope of Judge Cardozo’s
MacPherson analysis by equating property damage to personal
injury.  Seely has therefore been understood to hold that the law72
of warranty trumps tort in the absence of personal injury or
63. Id. at 147; see also WHITE, supra note 57, at 205.
64. Seely, 403 P.2d at 148.
65. Id. at 147.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 147-48.
69. Id. at 151.
70. Id. at 150.
71. Id. at 148, 152.
72. Id. at 152; see WHITE, supra note 57, at 204-07.
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property damage.  In other words, economic losses are governed by73
contract, not tort.
C. East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc.
Whereas Seely represented the majority view of denying recovery
in tort for economic losses, Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc.
outlined the minority position.  Santor interpreted strict liability74
as an appropriate method of shifting the total cost of a defect from
the consumer to the manufacturer.  In East River Steamship Corp.75
v. Transamerica Delaval Inc.,  the Supreme Court evaluated both76
competing approaches to give a unifying voice to the ELR.
The claims in East River arose from defective turbines on four
chartered ships.  Each of the ships’ turbines malfunctioned and77
forced the charterers not only to pay the cost of repairs but also to
lose profits while the ships were restored.  Unlike the contracts at78
issue in Seely, the charterers’ contracts included provisions stating
that the charterers took the ships in “as is” condition and would
bear the cost of any necessary repairs during the charter term.79
The charterers were therefore unable to bring a contractual claim
against the shipbuilder for breach of warranty.80
The charterers sued the turbine manufacturer for negligence and
strict liability, arguing that the defective design of the turbines led
to their repair expenses and lost profits.  The Court recognized81
that the broad risk of product failure, which the charterers assumed
in the “as is” provision, likely lowered the contract price.  It82
reasoned that the charterers should not be permitted to sidestep
this deliberate allocation of risk by bringing a tort claim against the
manufacturer of a component of the overall product.  The economic83
73. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 57, at 205.
74. 207 A.2d 305, 311-13 (N.J. 1965). 
75. Id.
76. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
77. Id. at 859-61.
78. Id. at 860-61.
79. Id. at 860, 875.
80. Id. at 875.
81. Id. at 861.
82. Id. at 873.
83. Id. at 867-68, 873.
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loss rule therefore barred the tort claim for repair costs and lost
profits by characterizing these losses as disappointed expectations
in the product itself.84
This Note argues that East River was an unusual example of
products liability because the “as is” provision clearly expressed the
plaintiffs’ intent to accept all risk of defects. In fact, Judge
Traynor’s Seely opinion had already suggested that “as is” sales
would not support liability for economic losses.  Nevertheless, East85
River holds that when a product component damages the larger
product, as opposed to other property, a plaintiff must ground his
claim in contract law and look to the product’s warranty for
recovery.  86
The Court made a strong argument against the conceptual
disaggregation of a product into its component parts. Such dis-
aggregation would permit a plaintiff to argue that his property—the
product—was harmed by a component part.  This logic would87
render warranty law useless because a plaintiff could continuously
subdivide his product until he found a tort claim against a remote
manufacturer beyond the scope of the warranty.  The problem that88
East River presented therefore became how to define the scope of
“other property” in specific applications.  89
84. Id. at 872.
85. Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 150 (Cal. 1965) (“Had defendant not
warranted the truck, but sold it ‘as-is,’ it should not be liable for the failure of the truck to
serve plaintiff’s business needs.”). 
86. See E. River, 476 U.S. at 872-73; see also, e.g., Steven R. Swanson, The Citadel
Survives a Naval Bombardment: A Policy Analysis of the Economic Loss Doctrine, 12 TUL.
MAR. L.J. 135, 177-78 (1987).
87. E. River, 476 U.S. at 867-68.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 867; see H. Hugh McConnell, The “Other Property” Problem – Applying the
Economic Loss Rule to Construction Contracting Claims, 74 FLA. B.J. 87, 87-90 (2000); see
also Michael E. Solimine, Recovery of Economic Damages in Products Liability Actions and
the Reemergence of Contractual Remedies, 51 MO. L. REV. 977, 987-88 (1986) (arguing that
East River superficially discarded the “fairness” to the plaintiff in favor of other
considerations, such as “economic principles”).
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D. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co.
In Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co.,  the Court90
confronted the flaws of East River by looking to the practical
realities of a commercial transaction. In Saratoga, another admi-
ralty case, a shipbuilder, Martinac, built a fishing vessel and sold
it to a fisherman.  This fisherman used the ship for several years.91 92
During that time, the fisherman installed nets and additional
fishing equipment on the ship.  He subsequently sold the ship to a93
fishing company, Saratoga.  After the sale, a defect in the ship’s94
hydraulic system, which had been installed by Martinac, caused the
ship to catch fire and sink.  Saratoga sued Martinac for the cost of95
the added fishing equipment that sank along with the ship.96
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit applied a textbook East River anal-
ysis, classifying Saratoga’s entire ship as the “product” and finding
that the equipment was merely a component of that product.97
Because the ELR governs the damage a product causes to itself, the
Ninth Circuit categorized all damage to the ship and its equipment
as economic loss—not property damage.  The ELR, in turn, pre-98
cluded tort recovery of the cost of the lost equipment because the
sales contract, not tort law, should have allocated the risk of this
loss.99
To reverse the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court critically exam-
ined East River and the limits of warranty law. Although the Court
acknowledged that Saratoga could have negotiated a warranty with
the fisherman to cover both the ship and the equipment, it would be
unreasonable to require such a warranty for recovery.  The100
fisherman was distinguishable from a manufacturer or a component
supplier because he lacked the ability to “systematically control the
90. 520 U.S. 875 (1997).
91. Id. at 877.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 877-78.
97. Id. at 878.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 880, 882.
100. Id. at 882-83.
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manufactured product’s quality or ... systematically allocate
responsibility for [the equipment he added] in similar ways” as
those used in the manufacturing process.  The mere possibility101
that a reseller could have offered a warranty did not support a
requirement that contract law must provide the exclusive remedy. 
The Court then determined that East River’s product-component
analysis did not apply to the facts before it. Unlike the component
of a larger product, the fishing vessel had been released into the
marketplace before the fisherman added the equipment.  The102
Court explicitly held that once a buyer purchases a product from
the manufacturer or distributor, any subsequently added equip-
ment ought to be considered “other property” under the East River
analysis.  103
The Saratoga analysis appreciates the purchase of a product from
the marketplace as a demarcation between a product’s manufacture
and its subsequent use. In the context of complex commercial
transactions, such as building construction, this approach provides
a logical distinction between service contracts with the consumer
and sales contracts with the manufacturer. Most importantly, it
suggests a clear limit to the product-component analysis of East
River. As the Supreme Court reasoned, a re-seller’s warranty for a
product should not eliminate the possibility of tracing a tort action
back to the original manufacturer.  104
III. THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE IN CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL
DEFECT CASES
Although East River was an admiralty case, it had a broad
impact on products liability law in state courts.  Saratoga has105
gained some recognition but generally represents a limited
101. Id. at 884.
102. Id. at 884-85.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 880-81.
105. See CAROLYN L. CARTER ET AL., NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER WARRANTY
LAW § 12.2.1 (4th ed. 2010) (describing the influence of East River on state law); Peter A.
Alces & Aaron S. Book, When Y2K Causes “Economic Loss” to “Other Property,” 84 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 44 (1999) (describing East River as “the seminal decision on the economic loss issue”).
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restriction of East River.  Even when state courts apply a product-106
component analysis, they do not uniformly accept either East River
or Saratoga.  The following discussion will describe how state107
courts frequently apply the ELR to construction cases and will show
that this application is problematic in the context of damage caused
by defective construction materials. 
A. Application of the Economic Loss Rule in Construction Cases
States have independently adopted their own versions of the
ELR, often including some form of the East River product-compo-
nent analysis.  Because construction law is a specialized subset of108
contract law, state courts often apply a previously established ELR
to construction claims without evaluating the unique aspects of
construction contracts.  As a result, the East River product-109
component analysis, rather than Saratoga marketplace analysis,
tends to provide the framework for evaluating the ELR in construc-
tion law claims.  110
106. See, e.g., Gunkel v. Renovations, Inc., 822 N.E.2d 150, 153 n.1, 156 n.8 (Ind. 2005)
(considering Saratoga to limit the product-component analysis to the contractual scope of
work); CARTER ET AL., supra note 105, § 12.2.8.2 (discussing Saratoga’s restriction of East
River).
107. CARTER ET AL., supra note 105, § 12.2.8.3.
108. See generally A STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO CONSTRUCTION & DESIGN LAW (Carl J.
Circo & Christopher H. Little eds., 2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter GUIDE] (providing a current
summary of the economic loss rule in each state). But see id. at 447 (indicating that
Louisiana, for example, does not recognize any ELR); Edward E. “Ned” Nicholas III & Sean
M. Golden, The Economic-Loss and Source-of-Duty Rules and the Wall Between Tort and
Contract in Virginia, 59 VA. LAW 42, 44-45 (2010) (discussing the additional complications
posed by the source of duty rule in Virginia).
109. See Circo, supra note 12, at 40-43 (explaining the need for a vigorous economic loss
defense tailored for the construction industry). See generally GUIDE, supra note 108
(providing a current summary of the ELR in each state). Some states do not have written
opinions addressing the ELR in the context of building construction. Id. at 535, 590
(providing the examples of Michigan and Mississippi); see also ABA COMM. ON CONSTR.
LITIG., STATE BY STATE SURVEY OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE IN CONSTRUCTION
LITIGATION (1996) (analyzing early applications of the ELR to construction claims).
Other articles outline practical approaches to pursue claims against a manufacturer or
supplier under the current ELR product-component analysis. See, e.g., Daniel S. Brennan,
Construction Defect Claims Against Manufacturers and Suppliers, CONSTR. L., Spring 2003,
at 15.
110. See, e.g., Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neal, Architects, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 55, 57-58
(Va. 1988) (citing East River to bar recovery for the consequences of a construction defect). 
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When applying the product-component analysis, courts will likely
classify an entire building, defined by the contractual scope of work,
as the product.  Construction materials are therefore often111
classified as components of a unified product: the building.  When112
these construction materials fail and damage the rest of the
building, this building damage will likely be classified as economic
loss, which is barred from recovery in tort.113
Bay Breeze Condominium Ass’n v. Norco Windows, Inc. provides
an example of this reasoning.  The court in Bay Breeze evaluated114
a condominium association’s claims of negligence, breach of war-
ranty, and strict products liability against a window manufac-
turer.  The manufacturer’s windows leaked water into the walls,115
resulting in extensive damage to the entire wall structure.  116
Evaluating the application of the ELR to the strict liability claim,
the court noted that Wisconsin’s “integrated system” test super-
seded a previous case distinguishing different parts of a building as
“other property.”  Relying on this test and looking to approaches117
in other jurisdictions, the court found that the building, as a whole,
was a finished product.  The court then classified the water118
damage to the wall as economic loss, which could not be recovered
in tort.119
111. See, e.g., Casa Clara Condo. Ass’n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244,
1247 (Fla. 1993) (“[T]o determine the character of a loss, one must look to the product
purchased by the plaintiff, not the product sold by the defendant.”). But see Lord v.
Customized Consulting Specialty, Inc., 643 S.E.2d 28, 33 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (“Because
there was no contract between the [plaintiff homeowners] and [the defendant truss
manufacturer], we further find that the economic loss rule does not apply and therefore does
not operate to bar the [homeowners’] negligence claims.”).
Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing Homeowners Ass’n v. Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing,
LC, 221 P.3d 234 (Utah 2009), is noteworthy because it expanded the product-component
analysis of building construction to its logical conclusion. Looking to the subject of the
construction contract, the court defined the “product” as an entire complex of townhomes. Id.
at 244. 
112. See 6 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER AND O’CONNOR ON
CONSTRUCTION LAW § 19:10, at 46-47 (2002).
113. Id.
114. 651 N.W.2d 738 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002). 
115. Id. at 741.
116. Id. at 740-41.
117. Id. at 744.
118. Id. at 746.
119. Id. at 744-46.
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B. The Problem with Applying the Economic Loss Rule to    
Construction Material Defect Cases
As discussed above,  a single contract rarely governs an entire120
construction project. Instead, a chain of contracts dictates each
participant’s role in the project.  These contracts include both121
service contracts and sales contracts.  The Owner is only a party122
to a portion of these contracts and is rarely a party to the sales
contracts for the construction materials.  123
This contractual paradigm severely limits each participant’s
ability to negotiate the risk of defective construction materials.
Although contractors typically provide a warranty to guarantee the
quality of the materials used in the project,  the Owner likely124
lacks any meaningful capacity to negotiate risk directly with a
manufacturer or supplier.  Liability for harm caused by defective125
materials is therefore forced to trickle through the chain of con-
tracts, tracing individual warranties.  Although other avenues are126
available, the chain of contracts is most likely to resolve the issue.127
As the following case illustrates, the ELR tends to encumber courts
with complex, wasteful litigation.128
Bellevue South Associates v. HRH Construction Corp.  illus-129
trates the consequences of inflexible reliance on this contractual
120. See supra Part I.
121. Circo, supra note 12, at 96-97 (discussing how the ELR fails to appreciate the
complexity of the relationships in a construction project).
122. See supra Part I.
123. See supra Part I.
124. See Senter, supra note 35, at 17 (discussing the contractor warranty provisions of
form contracts provided by the American Institute of Architects, the Associated General
Contractors of America, and the Construction Owners Association of America).
125. Because building owners rely on contractors to purchase construction materials, it
is unlikely that they have an opportunity to meaningfully negotiate risk as contemplated by
Seely or East River. See supra Parts I, II.
126. Although a manufacturer might provide an express warranty to the building owner,
“a manufacturer or supplier may have disclaimed consequential damages in the contract.”
Brennan, supra note 109, at 15; see also Senter, supra note 35, at 18-19 (discussing the
“exclusion of consequential damages”). These warranties are susceptible to “battle of the
forms” boilerplate material. Id. at 19. 
127. See generally GUIDE, supra note 108 (describing the statutory warranties that each
state provides); infra Part IV.C (addressing, briefly, the insurance consequences of building
damage).
128. See also infra Part IV.C (noting the additional complications created by insurance).
129. 579 N.E.2d 195 (N.Y. 1991).
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structure’s allocation of risk. Although the case did not involve
consequential building damage, it usefully illustrates the complexi-
ties of specifying and purchasing construction materials, a process
that tends to drag the entire Project Team into litigation when a
construction material is defective.  130
The plaintiff, a building owner, hired a contractor to build a
housing project.  The contractor then hired a subcontractor to131
provide the floor tiles according to the architect’s specification.132
This subcontract included an indemnity provision.  According to133
the architect’s specifications, only a specific manufacturer’s tile
could be used in the project.  The subcontractor proposed a sub-134
stitute manufacturer, an alternative that the architect initially
rejected.  Eventually, the architect approved the substitution on135
the condition that the tile meet specific performance characteris-
tics.  136
After installation, individual tiles began to fall apart.  Although137
the contractor and subcontractor initially replaced defective tiles,
they refused to continue replacement after a year.  The building138
owner subsequently sued both the contractor and subcontractor for
breach of contract, breach of express warranty, breach of implied
warranty of merchantability, and negligence.  He also brought139
claims against the tile manufacturer for strict liability, negligence,
and breach of implied warranty.  The subcontractor then sued the140
manufacturer for indemnity.141
Although both the trial court and appellate court permitted the
plaintiff ’s strict liability claim against the manufacturer,  New142
York’s Court of Appeals found that the ELR barred tort claims
130. The only harm was floor tile delamination. Id. at 197.
131. Id. at 196.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 197.
138. Id.; see also supra note 35 and accompanying text (explaining why the contractor and
subcontractor likely limited their remedial action to one year).
139. Bellevue, 579 N.E.2d at 197.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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against the manufacturer.  Any recovery, therefore, required143
tracing the contracts between the plaintiff, contractor, and subcon-
tractor. The trial court dismissed the breach of implied warranty
claims, but the plaintiff ultimately prevailed against the contractor
and subcontractor on the breach of contract claims.  144
The value of the damages that the court awarded to the plaintiff
exceeded the cost of replacing the tile,  so Bellevue does not sug-145
gest that contract inadequately protects building owners. Instead,
it shows that exclusive reliance on these provisions unduly burdens
the intermediate parties between the building owner and the
manufacturer. The case also demonstrates how the uncertainty of
construction litigation requires each party to allege a broad spec-
trum of claims against the remaining members of the construction
project.
Notably, the jury found that the underlying defect in the tile
originated at the factory.  Neither the contractor nor the subcon-146
tractor was likely to be better able to find or evaluate this latent
defect than the manufacturer.  Perhaps most importantly, no147
individual party was able to make a unilateral decision about what
product to use. The architect provided a proprietary specification
for a particular manufacturer’s tile,  so when the subcontractor148
wanted to use a different tile, the architect had to approve the de-
cision through the chain of contracts. This process precluded the
kind of “shopping around” that the Seely court believed would
protect a plaintiff from “industry-wide” liability provisions for
defective products.  This common contractual structure, in the149
end, does not provide the meaningful allocation of risk that is relied
upon to justify the ELR.
To understand why this contractual structure does not represent
the warranty theories of Seely or East River, one must distinguish
143. Id. at 200. 
144. Id. at 197. The trial court also dismissed the subcontractor’s indemnity claim because
of a remote business relationship to the manufacturer, but the Court of Appeals ordered that
the claim be retried. Id. at 203.
145. Id. at 197.
146. Id. 
147. The problem with the tile was “[a] failure of the adhesion between the wood slats and
foam backing.” Id. at 197.
148. See supra note 42 (describing proprietary specifications).
149. Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151-52 (Cal. 1965).
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a negotiated allocation of risk from a construction contract’s use of
warranty to transfer the cost of defects back to the source of the
defect.  Consider Seely’s purchase of the truck. Seely approached150
the truck market with unilateral authority to evaluate the risk
posed by each truck he encountered. He had the freedom to balance
this risk against the sale price and his desire to purchase the truck.
By purchasing White’s truck, Seely accepted a risk that reflected
his personal valuation of these factors. The contract therefore
adequately accommodated the possibility that the truck would not
meet Seely’s expectations. In essence, the contract allocated risk.
As described above, construction projects use a different process.
The selection of each product relies on the assent of multiple parties
within the project. The Contractor or subcontractor who purchases
a product relies on the Architect’s specifications to select adequate
construction materials. Likewise, the building owner relies on the
Contractor or subcontractor to negotiate the purchase of the
materials and screen for defects once the materials are delivered to
the site. No single party has unilateral authority to make decisions
about what product to use; the process is cumulative. 
This lack of unilateral authority precludes any individual mem-
ber of the project from evaluating the total cost-benefit analysis of
a single manufacturer’s product relative to alternative products.
Instead, each member must rely on the overall structure of the
construction contract to transfer the potential cost of defective
products to someone else. The individual construction contracts
within the chain, therefore, do not represent a negotiated allocation
of risk as envisioned by Seely or East River. Indeed, they merely
establish a framework to transfer the cost of defects when a
building owner triggers the warranty provisions. 
This cost-transference role of construction contracts shows that
the mere presence of a warranty should not represent the kind of
deliberate contemplation and negotiation of risk that Seely or East
River deemed to govern a purchaser’s expectations in a product.
When warranty merely provides a structure for cost transference,
150. This concept of using a contractual structure to transfer the cost of defects should be
distinguished from a “loss spreading” policy of products liability. See SHAPO, SEARCH, supra
note 46, at 10-11 (discussing policy considerations of products liability). The author believes
construction contracts use a “cost transference” process to protect the building owner while
simultaneously filtering the burden of defects back to the manufacturer. 
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contract law should not be considered superior to a legal allocation
of risk in tort. 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
This Note criticizes the East River product-component analysis
on the grounds that it relies too heavily on a desire to provide a
bright line separation of tort from contract.  This framework151
leaves little flexibility for complex agreements, such as construction
contracts, that mix service contracts with sales contracts. Courts
should distinguish the services in a construction contract from
the sales contracts for construction materials. As described below,
Saratoga provides a useful framework for this distinction. It appre-
ciates the ultimate purchase of a product from the market as a
static limit on the conceptual expansion of a product. Using the
Saratoga analysis, courts should classify individual construction
materials, rather than entire construction projects, as the products
governed by the ELR. 
Under this theory, an Owner would be permitted to bring a tort
action for the damage that a defective construction material caused
to the building, regardless of the contractual fortuity surrounding
the initial purchase of that material. The ELR would still apply to
economic losses, such as defective construction or the harm an
individual material caused to itself, because these actually are risks
that are properly governed by construction contracts.
A. Building Construction Should Be Distinguished from Product
Manufacturing
Seely might have been able to shop around for his ideal truck,152
but Owners seeking construction materials do not always enjoy the
same freedom.  Rather than perpetuating this fiction, courts153
should appreciate the substantive distinctions between product
manufacturing and building construction. As described above,
151. See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986) (“It is
clear, however, that if this development [of products liability] were allowed to progress too
far, contract law would drown in a sea of tort.”).
152. Seely, 403 P.2d at 152.
153. See supra Part III.B.
2011] TORT, NOT CONTRACT 297
courts evaluating construction claims typically look to the Owner
and what he “purchased” when applying the ELR.  The East River154
analysis often interprets the Owner as having purchased a building;
this approach suggests that each individual construction material
is a component of that product. In reality, however, the Contractor
merely performs a service by purchasing construction materials on
the market and then assembling them according to the Architect’s
unique design. 
This construction process is distinguishable from product manu-
facturing because product manufacturing involves the mass pro-
duction of products from unique components designed specifically
for that product.  The manufacturing process therefore places a155
manufacturer in the best position to inspect this multitude of
products, and their component parts, for defects before releasing
the completed products en masse to the unsuspecting public.156
The Contractor, who purchases construction materials on the
market, simply does not have the same opportunities for product
evaluation.  Contractors build each project on site according to157
unique plans and specifications, and they may use different mate-
rials on each project. Although the Construction Team is appropri-
ately required to inspect, and sometimes test, the construction
materials, the Contractor is ultimately an assembler, not a manu-
facturer. It is therefore unreasonable to interpret the Contractor’s
warranty as providing the exclusive remedy for hidden defects
generated by the construction material manufacturer.  The ELR158
should distinguish between sale of goods transactions within the
construction process and the service contracts with the Owner when
evaluating the scope of “other property.” Such recognition would
give the Owner discretion to pursue a claim directly against a
154. See supra Part III. 
155. Consider, for example, the number of parts that are unique to an automobile that a
single manufacturer produces in any given year. Within that product, the parts can be
further distinguished by finish level or style of the production model. See AUTO PARTS
WAREHOUSE, http://www.autopartswarehouse.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
156. See Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 883-84 (1997).
157. See supra note 36.
158. “[I]f the ‘defect’ is with the component part itself and not with the manner of its use
by the assembler-manufacturer, it would seem that the component part maker should be
directly responsible to one physically harmed by an event proximately caused by such defect.”
KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, at 705.
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negligent manufacturer rather than force him to disrupt a possibly
amiable relationship with the Construction Team or A/E.
B. Saratoga, not East River, Provides the Ideal Framework for
Construction Material Defect Claims
When a defective construction material damages the surrounding
built environment, a distinction between “disappointed expecta-
tions” and “other property” is arbitrary if defined merely by the
construction project’s contractual scope. The Contractor’s responsi-
bility to build a wall adjacent to a defective window has no bearing
on whether the defective window will ultimately leak and damage
that wall.  Even if the Owner is disappointed that the building did159
not meet his expecations, he is ultimately concerned that his prop-
erty—the wall—was damaged by a defective window. The definition
of “other property” under the ELR should not turn fortuitously on
the scope of the construction contract when property damage is
attributable to the failure of a specific construction material. The
wall will be similarly damaged and the Owner will be similarly
disappointed in the resultant property damage, notwithstanding
the wall’s classification as either new or existing construction.
Therefore, courts should consistently apply the classification of
“other property” to both new and existing construction.
For this reason, a Contractor’s contractual liability and a
manufacturer’s tort liability should not, as East River suggests, be
considered mutually exclusive.  The Owner’s disappointed ex-160
pectations in the project should be recognized as a direct and
foreseeable consequence of the underlying product defect, which is
159. Likewise, a Contractor’s use of defective Chinese drywall, which subsequently
corrodes metal components of a building, should not supplant the drywall manufacturer’s or
supplier’s tort liability for this product. For more information on this notorious product, see
Kristan B. Burch, Has Chinese Drywall Affected the Economic Loss Rule?, VA. LAW., Oct.
2010, at 30; Press Release, U.S. Consumer Prods. Safety Comm’n, Press Statement on
Corrosion in Homes and Connections to Chinese Drywall (Nov. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.cpsc.gov/info/drywall/nov2009statement.pdf; Drywall Information Center, U.S.
CONSUMER PRODUCTS SAFETY COMMISSION, http://www.cpsc.gov/info/drywall/index.html (last
visited Sept. 25, 2011).
160. See Saratoga, 520 U.S. at 882-83 (“[It has not been] explained why the ordinary rules
governing the manufacturer’s tort liability should be supplanted merely because the
user/reseller may in theory incur an overlapping liability in contract.”).
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attributable to the manufacturer.  Though a Contractor’s war-161
ranty can assuage the Owner’s general dissatisfaction with the
project, it should not supplant the underlying tort liability of the
window manufacturer.  The source of the Owner’s dissatisfaction162
is the defective window—which the manufacturer released into the
market—not the Contractor’s diligence in constructing the adjacent
wall.
In this regard, Saratoga provides a ready framework to apply the
ELR in construction material defect cases.  The defective construc-163
tion material is analogous to the ship in Saratoga. Just as adding
nets and fishing equipment to a defective ship did not rechar-
acterize the added equipment as part of a defective product, the
installation of a defective window into a satisfactory wall should not
require classifying the entire construction project as the subject of
disappointed expectations. Under this proposal, the Contractor is
equivalent to the “Initial User” in Saratoga because he assembled
marketable construction materials according to their intended
uses.  The Contractor’s process of aggregating discrete products164
should not conceptually merge one defective product with the
surrounding products. Instead, the ELR should consistently inter-
pret the “product” as the underlying defective construction mate-
rial. The rest of the building should therefore be classified as “other
property.”
To be clear, construction contracts can effectively negotiate the
risks associated with the performance of services. As discussed
above, the Owner negotiates directly with the Architect and
Contractor and has the ability to allocate risk for these services,
including any subcontracted services.  If the Contractor did not165
adequately perform his services, by incorrectly installing the
161. Cf. Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 185-88 (Wis. 2005) (Abrahamson,
C.J., dissenting) (arguing, with reference to Saratoga, that “disappointed expectations” and
“other property” are not mutually exclusive concepts).
162. Cf. Saratoga, 520 U.S. at 882-83.
163. The range of construction materials available at Lowe’s or Home Depot provides a
stark contrast to the “high pressure turbine” in East River. See E. River S.S. Corp. v.
Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 860 (1986).
164. Saratoga, 520 U.S. at 884 (“[E]quipment added to a product after the manufacturer
... has sold the product to an Initial User is not part of the product that itself caused physical
harm. Rather ... it is ‘other property.’”).
165. See supra Part I.
300 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:275
window, for example, then the contract properly governs the
Owner’s expectations in the project. 
C. There Is Precedent for Reevaluating the East River Analysis in
Construction Cases
Although this Note’s proposed reliance on Saratoga is novel, it
does not represent an unprecedented departure from the current
ELR analysis. As discussed above, state courts do not uniformly
apply the ELR.  This Part will show that the influence of East166
River is not absolute.
Most relevant to this Note’s thesis is a recent near-rejection of
the ELR by the Supreme Court of Washington.  In Eastwood v.167
Horse Harbor Foundation, Inc., the court refuted the argument that
tort and contract remedies are mutually exclusive under the ELR.168
Instead, the court held that the ELR merely demands a nexus
between the claimed injury and an independent tort duty to support
a tort cause of action.  This is a case-by-case analysis, which re-169
quires consideration of all circumstances, including “common sense,
justice, policy, and precedent.”170
In reaching this conclusion, the court referenced several con-
struction cases. It rationalized the application of the ELR in these
cases by recognizing that the construction contract provided the
Contractor’s, or Architect’s, only source of duty when the claimed
injury did not involve any independent duty of care under tort.171
The court’s analysis accords with the general thesis of this Note: the
ELR should remain in effect regarding the contracted services of a
construction project, but it should not look to the construction con-
tract to preclude otherwise actionable tort claims against remote
construction material manufacturers or suppliers.
166. See supra Part III.A.
167. See Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 241 P.3d 1256, 1261 (Wash. 2010).
168. Id. at 1261-62.
169. Id. at 1262 (“A review of our cases on the economic loss rule shows that ordinary tort
principles have always resolved this question [about how a court can distinguish between
claims in which a plaintiff is limited to contract remedies and cases in which recovery in tort
may be available]. An injury is remediable in tort if it traces back to the breach of a tort duty
arising independently of the terms of the contract.”).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1262-64.
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Some courts have also implicitly weakened the conceptual
integrity of the ELR in their analyses of construction-related claims
arising under commercial general liability (CGL) insurance poli-
cies.  Tort claims, not breach of contract claims, typically trigger172
CGL policies.  Insurers can therefore invoke the ELR as a shield.173
The typical East River product-component analysis supports
classifying many construction claims as economic loss governed by
contract rather than as property damage covered by the policy,
thereby eliminating them from coverage.  To find coverage under174
a CGL policy, courts have departed from their classification of the
entire building as a single product.  In this context, the courts175
have understood damage to a building as “property damage” under
the policy, notwithstanding the contract and warranty governing
the Owner’s expectations in the project.  If nothing else, this176
inconsistency between classifications of “other property” in the
traditional ELR context and property damage under CGL insurance
policies suggests that it is possible to refine the ELR analysis.
D. This Proposed Solution Does Not Unfairly Burden the Supply
Team
The justification of the ELR’s separation of tort from contract
relies partly on a desire to protect manufacturers from potentially
unlimited liability and to encourage the development of new
products.  The Court addressed these concerns in Saratoga,177
172. Patrick J. Wielinski, Negligence, Breach of Contract, and the Economic Loss Rule:
Dilemma for Insurance Defense Counsel in Construction Defect Litigation?, CONSTRUCT!,
Spring 2004, at 14, available at http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/mo/premium-
lt/newsletters/construction/con_spring2004.pdf.
173. Id. at 15.
174. Id. at 16-18.
175. Id. at 17.
176. Id.; see Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65, 74-75 (Wis. 2004)
(permitting the insured Contractor to recover under the CGL policy, notwithstanding the
court’s acceptance that the ELR might apply to the building damage at issue). But see id. at
91 (Roggensack, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile the economic loss doctrine is not directly applicable
to the insurance policy [the Contractor] purchased from American Family, it is implicated
in the coverage question because through the operation of the economic loss doctrine, [the
Contractor] cannot become ‘legally obligated to pay’ [the Owner] for a tort claim.”).
177. See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 870-71 (1986);
Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 150-51 (Cal. 1965); see also SHAPO, SEARCH, supra
note 46, at 171-83 (describing criticisms of products liability).
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recognizing that the availability of a tort claim is not dispositive of
the merits of that claim.  Courts still must consider factors that178
have been raised throughout this Note, such as foreseeability and
proximate cause.  179
Courts applying the East River product-component analysis tend
to look to the entire building as a product because it was the subject
of a construction contract.  Yet, if a Contractor subsequently180
renovates the building, the product component analysis requires
limiting the building “product” to the contractual scope of the
renovation. This example shows, again, that the manufacturer’s tort
liability for building damage turns fortuitously on the scope of work
within a construction contract. The belief that tort subjects the
Supply Team to excessive liability is therefore countered with the
argument that the ELR unfairly insulates the Supply Team.
Looking to the greater context of a construction project to dis-
tinguish “other property” from economic loss particularly insulates
the Supply Team from liability because construction materials are
intended for specific applications, notwithstanding the contractual
arrangement used to purchase them. As the Court asked in
Saratoga: “Why should a series of resales, after replacement and
additions of ever more physical items, progressively immunize a
manufacturer to an ever greater extent from the liability for
foreseeable physical damage that would otherwise fall upon it?”181
In other words, a hypothetical window manufacturer should antic-
ipate that a defective window will likely cause damage to the sur-
rounding walls, regardless of whether the window was purchased
by a subcontractor in a design-bid-build construction project or by
an ambitious homeowner renovating his own garage.
CONCLUSION
Construction material defect claims show that the East River
product-component analysis is not justified by the mere presence of
an overarching contract or warranty. Courts should reevaluate this
analysis to accommodate the practical application of warranty in
178. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 884 (1997).
179. Id.
180. See supra Part III.A.
181. Saratoga, 520 U.S. at 881.
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complex contract structures, such as construction contracts.
Saratoga has already established a useful framework to begin this
reevaluation because it distinguishes between the strengths of
contract and tort while appreciating the practical realities of
warranty law in complex contractual relationships. Looking to
Saratoga, courts should begin classifying building damage as “other
property” when it is caused by defective construction materials.
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